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ARE TAX "BENEFITS" FOR RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS CONSTITUTIONALLY
DEPENDENT ON BENEFITS FOR
SECUI.AR ENTITIES?
EDWARD

A

ZELINSKY*

Abstract: The Supreme Court generally conditions tax exemptions,

deductions, and exclusions for religious organizations and activities
upon the simultaneous extension of such benefits to secular institutions
and undertakings. The Court's position flows logically from its
ac,:eptance of the premise that tax exemptions, deductions, and
exdusions constitute subsidies. However, the "subsidy" label is usually
deployed in a conclusory and unconvincing fashion . The First
Amendment is best understood as permitting governments to refrain
from taxation to accommodate the autonomy of religious actors and
activities; hence, tax benefits extended solely to religious institutions
should pass constitutional muster as recognition of that autonomy.

INTRODUCTION

Does it matter constitutionally whether tax exemptions, exclusiom, and deductions for religious institutions and activities are
mate hed by comparable exemptions, exclusions, and deductions for
secular entities? The U.S. Supreme Court has, on several occasions,
answered this question affirmatively. For example, in Texas Monthly v.
Bullock, the Court struck a sales tax exemption for religious periodicals, principally on the ground that the exemption was limited to sectarian publications. 1
The plurality opinion in Texas Monthly relied, inter alia, upon the
Coul't's decision in Walz v. Tax Commission. 2 In Walz, the Court had
sustained New York's exemption of 1-eligious properties from real
property taxation, characterizing that exemption as part of a larger
policy that excluded from taxation "a broad class of property owned

* Professor of law at the Be njamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva Unive1·sity. He
wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Professor E\'elyn Brody and, as usual, Doris Zelinsky.
1 189 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
2 5ee id. al 11 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm' n, :~97 U.S. 664 (1970) ) .
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by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations. "3 The Walz Court upheld
New York's tax-exemption of religious properties on several grounds,
one of which was the simultaneous exemption of other types of properties owned by secular groups in the nonprofit sector. 4
This Article explores the extent to which the constitutionality of
tax benefits5 for religious institutions depend upon the simultan~ous
extension of such benefits to secular organizations. The issue is a
hardy perennial6 and of topical concern: while the final form and impact of President Bush's faith-based charitable initiative is to yet be
determined, an expansion of tax benefits is a likely component of this
initiative. 7 The issue thus arises whether, as a constitutional matter, 8
such benefits must extend to all charitable organizations and acth-ities
or whether expanded charitable deductions could, consistent with the
First Amendment, be limited to religious entities and undertakings.
In Sectiori I of this Article, I consider the three rationales for
providing tax exemptions, deductions, and exclusions: ( 1) that such
exemptions, deductions, and exclusions subsidize, (2) that they
define the base for taxation, and (3) that they minimize entanglement between government and religious institutions.

Walz. 397 U.S. at 664,673.
It was panicularly important to Justices Brennan and Hadan in the ir separntt- co ncurring opinions that New York exempted not just religious propenies, but also th•~ real
estate owned by a broad army of nonprofit entities. As we shall see i1tfra, the concerns of
these connuTingjustices ha\'e become central to the Court's current doctrine in this 1rea.
5 I use the tenn "tax benefits" advisedly since many tax provisions commonly denot ed
as "benefits" arguably define the tax base, rnther than subsidize, and the ter m "be11efits"
canies the possible connotation that these tax provisions constitute subsidies. See infra Part
I; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax 'Be1tefits' Constitutional~y Equivalent lo Direct E.,penditures?, 112 HARVARD LAW REv. 379, 394-95 (1998). In deference to con\'ention, I w.e the
term "tax benefi ts" in this Article but I do not intend the term to indicate that these provisions are properly characterized as tax subsidies or expenditures.
6 For example, as I write this Article, the Pe nnsylvania Legislature is considering a sales
tax exemption for all publications, the Pennsylvania Sup1·eme Court having strick,:n an
exemption limited to 1·eligious publications. See Ken Dilanian , Pennsylvania La111111ake·, Propose Exemption For All Books, STATE TAX NOTES, Mar. 20, 2001, at 54-28.
7 See Fred Stokeld, Bush Budget Plan ·would Promote Chmitabfe Giving, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Mai·. 22, 2001, at 69-2; see also Brant Goldwyn, Faith-Based Bills Would Offer Tax Breaks For
Cha1itable Giving, Seif-Help Accounts, DAILY TAX REPORT, Mar. 22, 2001; Patti Mohr, Bipartisan Faith-Based Bills llld1ule Incentives For Charitable Giving, TAX NOTES TODAY, Ap1·. 10, 2001,
al 56-3. On the Preside nt 's faith-based initiative m01·e genernlly, see Donald F. Kettl. HavingFaith in Faith. 14 GovERNING No. 7, 12 (Apr. 2001).
8 Of course, tax benefits focused exclnsh-ely upon 1·eligious act01·s might be co11stit11tional but less desirable as a matter of policy than benefi ts ex te nding to seculai· institutions
as well. My focus in this Article is limited to the constit11tional considerations.
3

4
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Section II reviews the Supreme Court case law exploring the constitutionality of tax benefits for religious entities and discusses these
cases in the context of the three rationales outlined in Section I. In
addition to Walz and Texas Monthly, these cases include Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 9 Follett v. Town of McCormick, 10 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v.
Board ofEqualization, 11 and Mueller v. Allen. 12
The final section summarizes my conclusions: As a matter of positive law, the question whether tax benefits for religious institutions
depend constitutionally on benefits for secular entities must be answered with a qualified "yes." In its present form, the Supreme Court's
case law generally conditions tax exemptions, deductions, and exclusions for religious organizations and activities upon the simultaneous
extension of such benefits to secular institutions and undertakings.
The Court's position flows logically from its acceptance of the premise
that these tax exemptions, deductions, and exclusions constitute subsidies.
However, as a normative matter, my conclusion is to the contrary.
In the context of tax exemptions, exclusions, and deductions, the
"subsidy" label is usually deployed in a conclusory and unconvincing
fashion. In this setting, the First Amendment is best understood as
permitting governments to refrain from taxation to accommodate the
auto,1omy of religious actors and activities; hence, tax benefits extended solely to religious institutions should pass constitutional muster as recognition of that autonomy. Since it is most convincing to
think of religious tax exemption as the acknowledgment of sectarian
sovereignty (rather than the subsidization of religion), there is no
compelling constitutional reason to link that exemption to the simultaneous extension of comparable tax benefits to secular entities and
undertakings.
[n final analysis, tax exemption does not subsidize churches, but
leaves them alone.

)il9 U.S. l05 (1943) .
321 U.S. 573 (1944) .
11 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
12 463 U.S. 388 (1983) .

9

10
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THE THREE RATIONALES FORT AX BENEFITS

Perhaps the most common characterization of tax exemptions,
exclusions, and deductions is that they subsidize. 13 From this penpective, the tax benefits extended to religious institutions and acthities
constitute a subsidy from the public fisc.
Likely the most famous statement of this perspective 1s Ulvsses
Grant's warning that religious property,
receiving all the protection and benefits of Government
without bearing its proportion of the burdens and expenses
of the same, will not be looked upon acquiescently by those
who have to pay the taxes. In a growing country, where real
estate enhances so rapidly with time, as in the United States,
there is scarcely a limit to the wealth that may be acquired by
corporations, religious or otherwise , if allowed to retain real
estate without taxation. The contemplation of so vast a
property as here alluded to, without taxation, may lead to
sequestration, without constitutional authority and through
blood. 14
From a variety of vantages, Grant's observations are curious. The
exemptions to which he was objecting were exemptions from local
and state property taxes, a surprising subject of presidential attemion.
Arguably, Grant's statement articulated a nativist subtext, a warning
against the growing power and property ownership of the Catholic
church. 15
Despite its questionable provenance, Grant's statement n ·presents a classic articulation of the notion that tax exemptions for
13 See Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. Rn . 971,
993 (1999) ('The word 'subsidy' has crept into our day-to-day characterization of tax exemptions.").
14 Grant made these observations in his 1875 State of the Union Message. See Wah, 397
U.S. at 71 5 n .17 (D011glas,J., dissenting); see also JEAN EDWARD SMITH, GRANT 570 (~'.001).
Grant's observations are widely quoted by those opposing tax exemptions for church,~s. See
Rev. L. M. Birkhead, A Preacher Advocates Church Taxation, at http:/ / www.infidels.org/ library / histo1·ical/rev_l_m_bit·khead / dmrch_taxation.hunl (Apr. 7, 2001).
15 Grant was certainly not immune from sentiments of this sort, having issued tlw anti-Semitic General Orders No.11 during the height of the Civil War. See GEOFFREY PERRET,
ULYSSES S. GRANT 237-38 (1997); BROOKS D. SIMPSON, ULYSSES S. GRANT 163-65 (~'.000);
SMITH, supra note 14, at 225-27, 459-60. Moreove1·, others writing at the same time as
Grant's statement explicitly linked the issue of tax exemption with the grnwing poHer of
the Catholic Church. See Stephen Diamond, Efficiency and Benevolence: Philanthrop.'c Tax
Exemptions in Nineteen th Century America, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES:
MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD (Evelyn Brody ed., forthcoming 2001).
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churches constitute a public subsidy of religion, which enables religious institutions to acquire real estate they otherwise could not afford.
In a similar vein (but, of course, without any of Grant's subtext),
my colleague Professor Marci A. Hamilton has recently written that
" [ t] he entrenchment of property tax exemption has created a powerful financial incentive for religious institutions to expand their range
of activities. "16
Among contemporary tax policy theorists, the subsidy approach
is today usually articulated in the vocabulary of tax expenditure analysis.17 The central premise of this analysis is that tax provisions fall into
two categories, normative provisions, which properly define the base
of the tax, and expenditure provisions, which deviate from the normative tax base in a fashion economically equivalent to direct government expenditures.1 8 There is nothing in this framework which
necessarily requires an expansive or restrictive approach to labeling
particular deductions, exclusions, or exemptions as either normative
or expenditure provisions. In practice, however, tax expenditure stalwarts have applied tl1e expenditure label broadly, leading them to
characterize many well-known tax provisions as expenditure-type subsidies from the public treasury.
Thus, Professors Surrey and McDaniel declare the federal income tax exemption of nonprofit institutions19 an expenditure, rather
than a normative, tax provision. 20 They similarly characterize the federal income tax's charitable deduction 21 as a tax expenditure. 22 The
federal tax expenditure budgets reflect this view that the charitable
deduction constitutes a tax expenditure. 23
16 Ma1·ci A. Hamilton, Free? Exercise, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 823, 861 (2001).
17 See King, supra note 13, at 994 ("The source of the tendency now to characterize an
'exemption • as a 'subsidy' is tax expenditure analysis.").
18 For more extensive discussion of tax expenditure analysis, see Edward A. Zelinsky,
James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Prncedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and
Tax hstitutions, 102 YALE L.J. ll65, ll68-71 ( 1993).
19 Seel.RC. § 501 (1994) .
20 STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 219 (1985) ("(T]he
U.S. tax u·eatment of non prnfit organizations should be classified as a tax expenditure.").
21 See I.RC.§ l 70 (l 994).
22 SURREY & McDANIEL, sujJra note 20, at 170 ("the code's charitable contribution tax
expenditure").
23 See, e.g. , Office of Management and Budget, "Budget Analytical Perspectives, Chapter 5-Tax
Expentitures," TAX Norns TODAY, Feb. 29, 2000, at 40-36 item 82 (listing as a tax expenditure the deductibility of contributions for education) , item 92 (listing as a tax expenditure
the deductibility of all charitable contributions other than those for education and
h ealtli) , ite m 101 (listing as a tax expenditure the d eductibility of contl"ibutions fo1·
h ealth) .
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From the tax expenditure perspective, tax provisions which exempt religious entities from taxation or which provide deduction,; for
contributions to such entities are simply public subsidies of religion,
equivalent to direct outlays. Thus, Professors Surrey and McDaniel, in
their analysis of Walz v. Tax Commission and the property tax exemption for churches, indicate that only Justice Douglas understood the
case correctly: the exemption of churches and synagogues from real
property taxation is unconstitutional as an expenditure-type subsidy
of religion. 24
An alternative understanding of deductions, exclusions, and exemptions is that they define the base of the relevant tax, rather than
subsidize. The best known academic proponent of this view is Professor Bittker, the leading critic of tax expenditure analysis. It is meaningless, Professor Bittker argues, to label a particular provision as a
deviation from a normative tax system unless and until there is
agreement on the contours of that system, agreement which is often
elusive and illusory. 25
From this perspective, Professor Bittker contends, it is plausible
to characterize the base of the New York real property tax as "personal
residences and business property."26 Hence, there is no "exemption"
or "subsidy" for religious or charitable properties since excluding
these properties from taxation "is simply a natural outgrowth of the
unavoidable process of defining the appropriate tax base. "27
Similarly, Professor Andrews defends the charitable deduction as
base-defining. 28 According to Professor Andrews, one of the two components of the income tax base is "private, preclusive household consumption. "29 Resources given to charity are not privately consumed in
a fashion which precludes others but are, instead, devoted to public
purposes. 30 Hence, a deduction for such resources is not a subsidy, but
a necessary step in measuring the taxpayer's income, a step which

24 SURREY & McDANIEL, mpm note 20, at 133 ("More to the point was Justice D0t1glas's
question in disse nt. ").
25 Boris I. Binker, Accom1tingfor Federal 'Tax Subsidies' in the N ational Budget, 22 :'1AT L
TAxJ. 244 (1969) .
26 Bods I. Biuke r, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L. J. 1285, 1291 ( l 9b9).
2, Id.
28 William D. Andrews, Personal Dedu ctions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309
(1972).
29 Id. at 371. The other compone nt of the in com e tax base is savings. This formulation
reflects the we ll-known Haig-Simo n s definition o f inco me as the sum of savings and consumption.
30 Id. at 344.
0
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recognizes that the taxpayer has not privately consumed these donated resources and thus has no income from them. 31
On numerous occasions, the courts, while not using contemporary nomenclature about tax base definition, have in substance articulated the same notion. 32 For example, the Connecticut Supreme
Court, in an 1899 decision about Yale's tax-exempt status, characterized that status in terms remarkably similar to Professor Bittker's:
The non-taxation of public buildings is not the exception
but the rule. The corporations, whether municipal or private, which own and are by law charged with the maintenance of such untaxed buildings, are not the recipients of
special privileges, in any sense obnoxious to the law. The
seats of government, State or municipal, highways, parks,
churches, public school-houses, colleges, have never been
within the range of taxation; they cannot be exceptions from
a rule in which they were never included. 33
Yet a third defense of exemptions, exclusions, and deductions for
religious institutions travels under such labels as "entanglement" and
"accommodation." From this perspective, churches and other religious institutions are removed from taxation to minimize conflict with
government. If, 011 the other hand, religious properties are taxed, the
inevitable result is discord between religious institutions and government.
Professor Brody formulates this notion through the evocative
term "sovereignty perspective,"34 a term which captures the autonomy
considerations underlying entanglement concerns in their strongest
form: "For all its imprecision, tax exemption keeps government out of
the charities' day-to-day business, and keeps charities out of the business of petitioning government for subvention. "35

31 Professor Andrews also defines the deduction for medical expenses as base-<lefining.
Professor Andrews' analysis is logically extended to the deduction for state and local taxes.
See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: Inco111e Measurement. Tax
Expeniitures and Partial, FunctionalDedul'libility, 6 AM.J. OF TAX PoL'Y 9, 31-32 (1987).
32 See infra notes 53-79, 144-58 and accompanying tex t.
33 Yale Univ. v. Town of New Haven, 42 A. 87, 91 (1899).
3~ Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conce/1tualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23
lowAJ. CORP. L. 585, 586 (1998) [hereinafter So11ereignty and Subsidy]; see also Evelyn Brody,
Legal Themies of Tax Exemption: So11ereig11ty Quasi and Real, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR
CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD (Evelyn Brody ed., forthcoming 2001).
35 Sovereignty and Subsidy, supra note 34, at 586.
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The entanglement/ accommodation approach squarely places
exclusions, exemptions, and deductions for religious entities and activities in the American tradition of separating church and state. As
Professor Jaffa has recently observed, with the emergence of Christianity,
the political history of Western man for the next millennium
and a half was dominated, especially in the High Middle
Ages, by the contest for preeminence between emperors and
popes, the two ultimate forms of rule in the post-classical
world .... [T] he solution to the problem of that relationship
of emperor and pope, or of Caesar and Christ, was only discovered in the American Revolution and the American
Founding, in the separation of church and state. 36
A key portion of that solution has been the financing of the state
through taxes which respect the autonomy of religious institutions
and activities.
As we shall see, 37 entanglement/ accommodation doctrine in the
tax context comes in three different forms. In its weakest version,
concern about entanglement is concern about secular authorities and
religious groups fighting over the boundaries of tax exemption. In
this incarnation, entanglement theory indicts tax benefits restricted
to religious institutions as engendering borderline conflicts and
justifies the denial of tax benefits to religious actors and activities to
eliminate such borderlines.
In a stronger version of the doctrine, exemplified by ChiefJmtice
Burger's Walz opinion, respect for the autonomy of sectarian persons
permits the state to refrain from taxing them. This form of permissive
accommodation justifies tax exemptions, exclusions, and deductions
which cover only religious institutions.
In its strongest form, entanglement considerations inform a reading of the First Amendment as compelling tax exemptions for religious persons. The critical normative issue in this area is which of these
three versions of entanglement doctrine is ultimately to control the
interpretation of the First Amendment.

36 HARRY V.jAFFA,
37

See infm Pan II.

A

NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM

140 (2000).
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THE CASES

This section reviews the Supreme Court's cases exploring the
constitutionality of tax benefits for religious entities. As we shall see,
those cases, starting with Murdock v. Pennsylvania38 and Follett v. Town of
McCormick, 39 have frequently split the Court. In its current state, the
Court's First Amendment doctrine conditions tax benefits for religious institutions on the concurrent extension of such benefits to secular entities. This position ultimately rests on the characterization of
tax exemptions, exclusions, and deductions as subsidies, a characterization which, when probed, proves unpersuasive.
For purposes of the present discussion, the most interesting features of Murdock and Follett are that, in those cases, the tax exemption
for religious activity was created by the Court itself, based on its understanding of the imperatives of the First Amendment, and that this
judicially-created exemption is exclusively for religious activity.
Murdock and Follett were both decided 5-4 and both involved municipal ordinances imposing flat licensing fees on persons selling
goods and merchandise in the community. 40 As the dissenters pointed
out, the challenged fees applied to all such persons and were not
proved excessive in amount. 41 Nevertheless, the Murdock Court held,
in au opinion by Justice Douglas, that the First Amendment required
exemption for Jehovah's Witnesses' canvassing activities. 42
Although the majority did not use the term "entanglement," it
reasoned in those terms. The fees imposed by the challenged ordi38319U.S.105 (1943).
39 321 U.S. 573 (1944) .
40 The license fee in Murdock was $1.50 for one day, $7.00 for one week, $12.00 for two
weeks, and $20.00 for three weeks. See 319 U.S. at 106. The license fee in Follett was $1.00
per <lay or $1 5.00 pe r year. See 321 U.S. al 574. The fees we1·e thus mu-elated lo the amount
of sales made by th e licensed canvasser. See Fol/ell, 321 U.S. at 574: Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106.
The flat nature of the fees assessed in Murdock and Follett became particularly critical in
subse, 1uen1 consideration of these cases. See inji-a notes I 02-108 and accompanying text.
4 1 See Murdoch, 319 U.S. at 11 8 (Reed,]. , dissenting) ( uNo evidence is offe red 10 show
the amount is oppressh·e .. .. The1·e is no contention in any of these cases 1ha1 such discrimination is pi-act iced in !he application of the ordinances.").
42 Id. at 105, 111-12. The Coun did not come to this conclusion easily. The Coun ini1ially 11pheld these kinds of fees as applied to J e hovah 's Witnesses and the n reversed itse lf.
Co111/J//re Follell, 321 U.S. at 573, and Mwdoch, 319 U.S. at 105, wi lhJones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584,597 (1942) ("When propone nts of religious or social theories use the ordinary commercial me thods of sales of articles to rnise propaganda fund s, it is a natural and proper
exercise of th e power of the State to charge reaso nable fees for the privilege of canvassing."). Oj1elika was authored by Justice Reed who dissent ed in Murdoch and concurred in
Fol/ell o nly because, at that point , he viewed Murdock as controlling preced e nt. See Fol/ell,
321 U.S. at 578.
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nances imposed unacceptably intrusive burdens on the exercise of
religious rights, i.e., the Jehovah's Witnesses' canvassing. It does not
matter, for First Amendment purposes, that comparable burdem are
imposed on commercial activity: "The constitutional rights of those
spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed word
are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers
of books. "43
While "religious groups and the press" can be taxed to defray the
costs of government, the flat license fees imposed constitutionally unacceptable burdens directly on the exercise of the Jehovah's Witnesses' First Arnendment rights: "It is one thing to impose a tm~ on
the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. "44
The Murdock minority would have none of this. The ordinances,
they contended, imposed "nondiscriminatory, nonexcessive taxation. "45 The Murdock majority thus created "a tax subsidy" by holding
the Jehovah's Witnesses immune from the fees imposed by municipal
ordinance. 46
A year later, Follett confirmed the Court's division. The narrow
majority concluded again that the First Amendment requires exemption from a municipality's flat license fee for Jehovah's Witnesse5' religious solicitors. The majority further denied that this conclusion
"mean[s] that religious undertakings must be subsidized" or that religious groups and actors cannot be subject to taxation: "But to say
that they, like other citizens, may be subject to general taxation does
not mean that they can be required to pay a tax for the exerci~e of
that which the First Amendment has made a high constitutional privilege. "47
Concurring with Justice Douglas's opinion for the Follett Court,
Justice Murphy took particular aim at the minority's claim "that the
effect of our decision is to subsidize religion: "48 "[T] his is merely a
harsh way of saying that to prohibit the taxation of religious acthities
is to give substance to the constitutional right of religious freedom. "49

Murdock, 319 U.S. at 111.
Id. at 112.
45 Id. at 121 (Reed,J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 130 (Reed,J., dissenting) .
4 7 Follett, 321 U.S. at 577-78.
48 Id. at 578-79 (Murphy,J., conc11ning).
49 Id. at 579 (Murphy,J., concmring) .
43
44
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The minority remained unconvinced. The challenged license fee
was neither "discriminatory" nor "onerous. "50 As a result of the majority's decision exempting him from the municipal license fee, Mr. "Follett will enjoy a subsidy for his religion. "51
.Justice Murphy's observations presaged those of Professor Bittker
a generation later and highlight the problematic nature of the tax
subsidy label. It is only compelling to declare a tax exemption a subsidy after one has established the nonnative tax base from which such
exemption is a departure. There is no subsidy if the activity excluded
from taxation should not have been taxed in the first place. However,
the Murdock/ Follett minority never specifies the normative tax from
which exemption for religious solicitors constitutes a subsidizing deviation.
The implicit premise of the minority's position is that the municipal ordinances in question establish normative taxes so that any
deviation from the mandate of those ordinances constitutes a subsidy.
But this unstated premise confronts, without answering, the entanglement concerns of the majority: if the ordinances unacceptably intrude upon the exercise of First Amendment rights by directly burdening religious solicitation, those ordinances cannot constitutionally
establish a baseline from which deviations can be deemed subsidizing.
By definition, an unconstitutional tax cannot serve as a normative
baseline.
In short, the Murdock/ Follett minority reasons circularly when it
characterizes the judicially-created exemption for religious canvassers
as a "subsidy." If one starts with the premise that the challenged municipal ordinances are a nonnative standard, it indeed creates an expenditure-type subsidy to exempt from their coverage religious solicitors. However, the premise that the ordinances can constitutionally
serve as a normative baseline assumes away the majority's concern,
i.e., that, as a First Amendment matter, entanglement considerations
in the first instance preclude the application of these ordinances and
their fees to religious solicitors. If entanglement concerns do forbid
localities from assessing license fees from sectarian canvassers, tax
statutes imposing such fees violate the First Amendment and, hence,
cannot constitutionally serve as a baseline for measuring subsidization .

50

51

ld. at 579-80 (Murphy, J., concmring).
Id. at 581 (M111·phy,J., conn11Ti11g).
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The opinions of the Murdock/ Follett minority further suggest why
the Court's subsequent case law often focuses upon the simultaneous
extension vel non of tax benefits to secular as well as religious institutions. If exemptions, exclusions, or deductions do constitute subsidies, subsidies restricted to religious entities and activities raise troubling Establishment Clause issues. Indeed, a subsidy underwriting
only religious activity would appear to be the classic target at which
the Establishment Clause is aimed. If, on the other hand, such tax
provisions are characterized as subsidies but extend to broad categories of nonprofit institutions, it is arguably not religion as such being
subsidized, but eleemosynary activity more generally.
While Murdock and Follett divided the Court, Walz v. Tax Cwimission, upholding New York's tax exemption for religious properties,
was an 8-1 decision. 52 However, the Court's near-unanimity as to result did not reflect near-unanimity as to reasoning as two of the eight
justices who sustained the New York exemption did so on grounds
quite different from those of their colleagues. Indeed, the Court's
subsequent decisions made these concurrences, not the Walz majority
opinion, the controlling statement of the Court's jurisprudence in
this area. 53
Writing for six members of the Walz majority, Chief Justice Burger sustained New York's real property tax exemption for religious
institutions in entanglement/accommodation terms. The goal of the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, Chief Justice Burger wrote,
is to find a path between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
"to avoid excessive entanglement" of government and religious institutions,54 thereby "prevent[ing] the kind of involvement that would
tip the balance toward government control of churches or goYernment restraint on religious practice. "55
Given a constitutionally-based concern with "the autonomy and
freedom of religious bodies,''56 it is plausible for New York and other
states to determine that such bodies "should not be inhibited in their
activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties
for nonpayment of taxes. "57

52

Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970) .
See infra not es 91-159 and accompanying text.
5 ~ 397 U.S. at 669-70.
53

55
56

57

Jd.
Id. at 672.

Id.
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Grants of exemption historically reflect the concern of
authors of constitutions and statutes as to the latent dangers
inherent in the imposition of property taxes; exemption
constitutes a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard
against those dangers .... 58
Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of
church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct
confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those
legal processes ....59
The hazards of churches supporting government are hardly
less in their potential than the hazards of government supporting churches ... _60
The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of
churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship between church
and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other. 61
There is an important distinction between the Murdock/ Follett
version of First Amendment entanglement doctrine articulated by Justice Douglas and the entanglement jurisprudence enunciated by
ChidJustice Burger in Walz. In Murdock and Follett, the Court held tax
exemption to be constitutionally required. This represents entanglement concerns in their su·ongest possible formulation: exemption is
constitutionally compelled to separate church and state. In contrast,
the Walz Court held tax exemption to be constitutionally "permissible
state accommodation" of religious institutions. 62
While entanglement concerns constitute the crux of ChiefJustice
Burger's Walz opinion, the opinion expounds two subthemes, both of
which are important to the topic of this Article. First, Chief Justice
Burger placed New York's exemption for religious institutions within
the context of simultaneous exemption for the real property of secular deemosynary institutions, "a broad class of property owned by
nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic
58

Id. at
Walz,
60 Id. at
61 Id. at
62 Id. at
59

673.
397 U.S. at 674.
675.
676.
673.
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groups."63 New York thus does not exempt "churches as such."64
Rather, New York "has an affirmative policy that considers these
groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and
finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest."65
These observations do not fit comfortably with the entanglement/ accommodation theory at the core of the Chief Justice's Walz
opinion. There is, after all, no First Amendment restraint on goyernment involvement with hospitals or playgrounds.
It is, accordingly, tempting to dismiss these observations as di,;ta. I
think, however, that it is more sensible to read these comments as an
answer to Justice Douglas's Walz dissent. 66 Justice Douglas indicted the
New York tax exemption as a subsidy. If there is a subsidy, Chief Justice Burger replied for the majority, it is not a subsidy of religion "as
such" but a subsidy of eleemosynary activity more generally.
A second subtheme of the Chief Justice's Walz opinion is the legislative discretion to determine tax classifications and rates. In Gibbons
v. District of Columbia, the Supreme Court in 1886 construed a federal
statute for the District of Columbia which limited tax exemption to
church buildings and the land underlying such buildings. 67 On the
basis of this statute, the Gibbons Court denied exemption to churchowned property which had been left vacant in anticipation of it becoming income-producing. 68 In Walz, Chief Justice Burge1· quoted
from the Gibbons decision:
In the exercise of this (taxing) power, Congress, like any
State legislature unrestricted by constitutional provisions,
may at its discretion wholly exempt certain classes of property from taxation, or may tax them at a lower rate than
other property. 69
Chief Justice Burger cited this passage from Gibbons to demonstrate that the Court at that time implicitly accepted the constitutionality of tax exemptions for religious institutions. 70 This reading is fair
as far as it goes. However, the passage from Gibbons implies more than
63

64
65

Jd,
Walz, 397 U.S. at 673.
/d.

66

See id. al 707.
See 116 U.S. 404,406 ( 188li) .
68 See id. al 428.
69 Walz, 397 U.S. at 679-80 (quoting Gibbons, 116 U.S. at 408). The pa1·enthc tical was
67

added to th e language of Gibbons by th e ChiefJustice.
70 See id. at 680.
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this: Congress "may at its discretion" tax certain properties at lower
rates and may wholly exempt from taxation other kinds of properties.i1
Read in the context of the original Gibbons opinion, the statement is consistent with the claim that legislatures possess great latitude in defining tax bases. 72 That "discretion, " in turn, suggests the
challenge inherent in identifying normative tax bases and the consequeut difficulty proclaiming any particular exclusion, exemption, or
deduction as subsidizing rather than base-defining: there is no subsidy
until there is a generally-accepted nonnative base from which such
exclusion, exemption, or deduction is a deviation. Since, however,
legislatures have great discretion when defining tax bases, it is often
problematic to label a tax provision as a subsidy.
.Justice Brennan's concurrence in Walz, while supporting the majority's result, does not embrace its entanglement/accommodationist
reasoning 73 but, rather, focuses upon the broad range of secular institutions and activities supported by the exemption. Indeed, there is a
straight line from Justice Brennan's Walz concurrence, supporting tax
exemption for churches as part of a broad exemption for sectarian
and secular eleemosynary property, to Justice Brennan 's Texas Monthly
opinion, rejecting sales tax exemption limited to religious publications.74
While Justice Brennan opined that "[t]ax exemptions and general subsidies ... are qualitatively different" from one another, his doctrinal support for the property tax exemption of religious property
ultimately rests on subsidy grounds. 75 New York's exemption of
church properties serves the secular purpose of encouraging
churches'

See id.
See, e.g., Bittke1·. s11.jJra no te 25, at 244; Edward A. Ze linsky, For Realiznlion: Income
Taxah on, Sectoral Accrelionism, and the Vi rtue of Attainable Virtues, I 9 C ARDOZO L. REv. 861 ,
889-93 ( I 997).
73 Justice Bre nn an d oes me ntion e nt angleme nt concern s. See Walz., 397 U.S. at 691-92
("the terminatio n of exe mptions would give rise " to e nt angle ment problem s.). H owever,
Justic,~ Bre nn an makes these co mments almost in passing; they are no t central to his analysis. Se.? id.
;~ See Texas Mo nthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. I , 5- 25 (1989).
75 See H11lz, 397 U.S. at 690. Much o f Justice Bre nn an 's concmTe nce is his1 01·ical in n ature , designed to d e mo nstrate that , as a m ailer o f past practice, property tax exe mptio n s
for ch,rch es we1·e co nsidei-ed accept able under the First Ame ndme nt. See id. at 681-88. As
I sugi;est, infra, this historical d ata ultim ate ly suggests that the founding gene.-atio n conce i\'e<I of tax exe mptio n as a form o f separatio n , 110 1 subsidy.
ii
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public service activities and of a pluralistic society. During
their ordinary operations, most churches engage in activities
of a secular nature that benefit the community; and all
churches by their existence contribute to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise so highly valued by all of
us.76
It was, moreover, critical to Justice Brennan that this exemption
covers both the properties of secular institutions and the properties in
which churches conduct secular activities:
[T]hese [religious] organizations are exempted because
they, among a range of other private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the well-being of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear burdens that
would otherwise either have to be met by gene1'.al taxation,
or be left undone, to the detriment of the community.... 77
Government may properly include religious institutions
among the variety of private, nonprofit groups that receive
tax exemptions, for each group contributes to the diversity
of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society. 7s

It is thus not surprising that, when Texas Monthly confronted the
Court with a sales tax exemption limited to religious publications, Justice Brennan found that narrow exemption distinguishable from the
broad exemption at issue in Walz. 79
Justice Harlan's Walz concurrence endorses Justice Brennan's
emphasis on the breadth of the New York exemption. 80 Moreover, Justice Harlan linked that breadth with entanglement concerns, concluding that there is less entanglement danger when an exemption is
broad:

76

Id. at 692-93.
Id. at 687. Chief Justice Bm·ger, for the Wal.z majo1·ity, specifically rejected an} linkage between churches' property tax exemptions and their seculai· good woi·ks. See id. at
77

674.
Id. at 689.
See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14.
80 See 397 U.S. at 697 (Harlan, J., concuning) ("As long as the b1·eadth of exemption
includes groups that pursue culturnl, morn), or spiritual imp1·ovement in multifarious secular ways, including, I would suppose, groups whose avowed te nets may be antitheological,
atheistic, or agnostic, I can see no lack of neutrality in extending the be nefit of the exemption to organized religious groups.").
78

79
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In the instant case noninvolvement is further assured by the
neutrality and breadth of the exemption. In the context of
an exemption so sweeping as the one before us here its administration need not entangle government in difficult
classifications of what is or what is not religious, for any organization-although not religious in a customary sensewould qualify under the pervasive rubric of a group
dedicated to the moral and cultural improvement of men.
Obviously the more discriminating and complicated the
basis of classification for an exemption-even a neutral
one-the greater the potential for state involvement in
evaluating the character of the organizations. 81
These observations highlight the ambiguity, in the tax context, of
the concept of entanglement. Justice Harlan suggested that a property
tax exemption limited to only religious organizations is more entangling than no exemption at all since a limited exemption involves litigation and controversy as to its boundaries. Thus, at its core, Justice
Harlan's concept of entanglement is the avoidance of conflict as opposed to the accommodation of autonomy or, in Professor Brody's apt
phrase, the sovereignty of religious institutions. From the latter perspective, an exemption applicable only to religious actors, like the judicially-created exemption of Murdock and Follett, can represent nonentanglement at its most fundamental-the recognition that Free
Exe1cise entails a zone of religious autonomy into which the government may not inu·ude via taxation.
In short, Justice Harlan's entanglement doctrine represents that
doctrine in its weakest form , unconcerned in the Free Exercise context with the institutional and communal autonomy of religious entities and individuals, but merely concerned with the avoidance of litigation and conflict between church and state. Under this approach,
tax statutes which tax religious organizations and practices are defensible in First Amendment terms, as such statutes avoid borderline disputes over narrowly drawn exemptions.
In contrast, Justice Burger's opinion for the Walz majority exemplifies entanglement theory in a stronger form, sensitive to the sovereignty of religious organizations and actors, allowing the state to exempt religious institutions from taxation to avoid governmental
intrusion upon the resources and autonomy of religious institutions

81

Id. al 698-99 (Harlan,J., concurring) .
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and actors. Under this permissive/ accommodationist approach, the
state has wide latitude to grant tax benefits to religious persons because such benefits are understood as recognizing sectarian autonomy, protected by the First Amendment.
Finally, Murdock and Follett represent entanglement theory in its
strongest form, compelling government to grant tax exemption to
protect the sovereignty of religious organizations and actors.
Justice Douglas, the author of Murdock and Follett, was the dissenter in Walz. For purposes of the present discussion, three aspects of
Justice Douglas' Walz opinion are noteworthy. First, Justice Douglas
based his dissent on the theory that "[a] tax exemption is a subsicly."82
"I would suppose that in common understanding one of the best ways
to 'establish' one or more religions is to subsidize them, which a tax
exemption does. "83
Second, Justice Douglas rejected the contention, accepted by Justices Harlan and Brennan, that the subsidization of religious entities is
constitutionally permissible when matched by equivalent subsidization
of secular nonprofits:
Government could provide or finance operas, hospitals, historical societies, and all the rest because they represent social
welfare programs within the reach of the police power. In
contrast, government may not provide or finance worship
because of the Establishment Clause any more than it may
single out "atheistic" or "agnostic" centers or groups and
create or finance thern. 84
Finally, Justice Douglas, not surprisingly felt compelled to reconcile his Murdock and Follett opinions with his constitutional condemnation of New York's property tax exemption. Murdock, Justice Douglas
noted, distinguished between a constitutionally forbidden tax imposed directly on religious activity and a constitutionally acceptable
levy imposed on the income of religious actors or on the "property
used or employed in connection with those activities. "85
However, this observation, accurate as far as it goes, does not fully
address the tension between, on the one hand, the exemption-assubsidy argument embraced by Justice Douglas in Walz ("[a] tax ex-

82
83
84

85

Id. at 704 (Douglas,]. , dissenting).
Id. at 701 (Douglas,]. , dissenting).
Id. at 708-09 (Douglas,]., disse nting).

397 U.S. at 707 (Douglas,]., disse nting) (quoting Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112).
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emption is a subsidy"86 ) , and, on the other hand, the rejection of the
subsidy label in Murdock and Follett (Murdock and Follett do not "mean
that religious undertakings must be subsidized "87).
The divisions manifest in Murdock, Follett, and Walz reappear in
Texas Monthly. 88 Like Walz, Texas Monthly produced four separate opinions. However, unlike Walz, in Texas Monthly, no single opinion garnered the support of more than three justices. Quite aptly, Judge
Noonan has labeled Texas Monthly an "enigma. "89
Texas Monthly involved a Texas sales tax statute which applied to
all s,~cular publications but not to religious literature. In a plurality
opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, Justice Brennan
found this narrowly focused sales tax exemption for religious publications distinguishable from the broad property tax exemption upheld
in ·walz. Hence, the Texas sales tax statute violated the Establishment
Clause.
The central focus of Justice Brennan's Texas Monthly opinion is
the same as of his Walz concurrence: the breadth of the tax exemption. According to Justice Brennan, in Walz, it was critical that the
property tax exemption sustained by the Court excludes from taxation "real estate owned by a wide array of nonprofit organizations. "90
The breadth of New York's property tax exemption was essential to our holding that it was 'not aimed at establishing,
sponsoring, or supporting religion,' but rather possessed the
legitimate secular purpose and effect of contributing to the
community's moral and intellectual diversity and encouraging private groups to undertake projects that advanced the
community's well-being and that would otherwise have to be
funded by tax revenues or left undone. 91
As a summary ofJustice Brennan's own Walz concurrence, as well
as Justice Harlan's separate opinion, this characterization is accurate. l 2 It is, however, not a convincing portrayal of Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion for himself and five of his colleagues, an opinion which concentrates upon "the autonomy and freedom of religious
86

Id. at 704 (Douglas.J.. dissenting) .
Follett. 321 U.S. at 577-78.
88 Texas Mo nth~)', 489 U.S. at I.
87

89 JOHN
90

T.

NOONA N ,JR., THE L USTRE OF OUR COUNTRY

See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5.
9 1 Id. at 12 (internal citatio n o mitted) .
92 See \,fo.lz, 397 U.S. at 690-704.

195 (1998) .
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bodies" and which addresses the breadth of the New York exemption
as a secondary theme.93
Justice Brennan's emphasis upon the reach of the New York
property tax exemption, and the contrasting narrowness of the Texas
sales tax exemption, is understandable in light of his other critical
move in Texas Monthly: "Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy. "94
It is a short step from this premise to the conclusion that "Texas' narrow exemption"95 for sales of religious literature violates the Establishment Clause as a forbidden government subsidy of religion.
Once again, difficulties appear if we probe beneath the "subsidy"
label. Suppose a state with no corporate income tax but with a sales
tax. Few, if any, would say that such a tax scheme subsidizes religious
corporations by exempting their incomes from taxation. In this instance, no corporate income is taxed. The generally-accepted characterization of this hypothetical state's tax code would be that this state
has, for better or worse, selected sales as a tax base and excluded corporate income from taxation as a matter of base definition.
It is consequently not true that "[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy. ''96 As Professor Bittker noted over a generation ago, it
is only sensible to speak of exemptions as subsidies if there is an
agreed upon tax base from which such exemptions deviate. 97
The inquiry thus becomes whether there is a generally-accepted
normative tax base from which the Texas exemption for sales of religious literature deviates. The implicit premise of Justice Brennan's
opinion is that the normative base is a tax on all sales; hence, to exclude from taxation sales of religious literature is a subsidizing departure from the normative base. This, in turn, raises the question
whether "all sales" is a constitutionally proper tax base from which to
measure subsidizing deviations or whether, as a First Amendment
matter, it is normatively appropriate for Texas to define its sales tax
base to accommodate religious activity.
In sum, that Texas' sales tax exemption for religious literature
constitutes a "subsidy" is a conclusion, not an analysis. That conclusion depends upon whether such an exemption entangles secular and
sectarian authority unacceptably, or whether exemption is required
(or permitted) to prevent such entanglement. If that exemption is
93
94

95
96
97

Id. at 672.
489 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14.
Ser Bittker, snpm n o te 25, at 260-61.
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constitutionally mandated or permitted, the exemption is not a "subsidy'' but, rather, implements a constitutionally proper tax base.
Consequently, it is critical which version of entanglement doctrine is applied to the Texas sales tax statute. The Murdock/Follett renditicn of entanglement theory indicates that Texas' sales tax exemption for religious literature is constitutionally required. Justice
Burger's accommodationist version of entanglement doctrine suggests
that this exemption is constitutionally permissible. Justice Harlan's
formulation of entanglement theory indicates that this narrow exemption is constitutionally forbidden. Not surprisingly, Justice Brennan, and his two colleagues who constituted the Texas Monthly plurality, cpted for Justice Harlan's approach.
To nudge aside Murdock, Follett, and their su·ong form of entanglement theory, Justice Brennan deployed a dual strategy: to "disavow" parts of the Murdock and Follett opinions and to cabin what is
subsequently left of those opinions into the particular factual circumstances of those cases. 98 The plurality's outcome in Texas Monthly is,
Justice Brennan acknowledged, "admittedly in tension with some unnen·ssarily sweeping statements in" Murdock and Follett. 99 Indeed. As
noted earlier, the Murdock Court declared: "The constitutional rights
of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and
printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or
wholesalers of books. "100
For the Texas Monthly plurality, precisely the opposite is u·ue: differential sales tax treatment for religious and nonreligious publications constitutes an unacceptable subsidization of religion. Hence, to
the extent Murdock and Follett suggest otherwise, Justice Brennan and
his colleagues "disavow[ ed]" those opinions. 101
Since Justice Brennan and his two colleagues did not overrule
Murdock and Follett 102 (but just "disavow[ed]" those opinions' "unnecessarily sweeping statements"), they sought to distinguish Mwdock and
FoUett from Texas Monthly by emphasizing three aspects of the municipal license fees challenged in those earlier cases. First, the fees challenged in those cases were "occupation tax[ es]" unlike the sales tax at

9e

Set' Tl'xns Monthly, 489 U.S. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
100 319 U.S. at 111.
10 1 Texas Monthl:y, 489 U.S. at 21.
1c2 Indeed, it is not clear what it would m ean for three justices
de nt.
9S

10

overrule prior prece-
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issue in Texas Monthly. 103 Second, the Murdock/ Follett municipal fees
were "flat"104 levies which imposed upon religious canvassers burdens
"far from negligible. "105 Finally, the municipal taxes imposed in /\,fu-rdock and Follett "restrain[ed] in advance" 106 by requiring payment before the Jehovah's Witnesses engaged in religious solicitation.
Little of this is persuasive. Why is it constitutionally relevant that
the lvlurdock/ Follett fees were structured as license fees on the occupation of soliciting while the Texas levy is denominated a sales tax? Justice Brennan never tells us why the formalistic distinction is relevant.
The economic incidence of the two levies is the same. To the extent
the taxes are passed onto purchasers, both increase the final price of
religious materials; to the extent the taxes are absorbed by the sellers,
both levies discourage the purveyors of religious materials. Thus, as a
substantive matter, it makes no difference whether the tax is styled as
an occupational fee or as a sales tax. 107
It, moreover, rewrites Murdock and Follett to characterize the burdens imposed by the municipal ordinances as "far from negligible. "108
The Murdock/ Follett dissenters consistently noted the absence of evidence that the challenged municipal license fees were onerous; the
majority never disagreed. It thus revises the story of Murdock and Follett to suggest that the Court invalidated the municipal fees as economically burdensome.
It is, finally, true that the license fees imposed in Murdock and
Follett are payable prior to solicitation and sales while the Texas tax is
collected after the sale occurs and the seller has cash with which to
pay the tax. From a cash flow perspective, a tax collected earlier, prior
to the event giving rise to taxpayer liquidity, is obviously tougher on
the taxpayer than a tax collected later, when the taxpayer has the cash
with which to pay. 109 It is, however, difficult to see that the broad con-

103

Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 24.
Id.
105 Id. al 23.
106 Id. at 24 (quo1i11g Mwdork, 319 U.S. at 114) .
107
In<leed, in Swaggart i\lli11istries v. Board of Equalization, Justice O'Connor distinguished Follett and M1mloclt 011 I.he other two grounds suggested by Justice Brenn an in
Texas A1.onthly but did not p111"sue his distin ction betwee n occupation and sales tax1:s. See
generally Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 ( 1990).
108 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 23.
109 Such liquidity concerns constitute a majo1· justification for the income tax rule of
realization which generally postpones taxation until the taxpayer has cash. See Zelinsky,
supm note 72, at 889-93.
104
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stitutional assertions of Murdock and Follett come, in the final analysis,
down to this.
In short, Justice Brennan's app1~oach to Murdock and Follett is unpersuasive. However, by rejecting the Murdock/ Follett version of entanglement doctrine in its strongest form, Justice Brennan set the
groundwork for his embrace of the weaker version of entanglement
theory exemplified by Justice Harlan's Walz concurrence. Under that
theory, Texas' narrow exemption of religious publications from sales
taxation "produce[s] greater state entanglement with religion than
the denial of an exemption" since the state must determine the borders of that restricted exemption and such determination will enmesh
the :,late in conflict with groups claiming the protection of the exemption.110
As the Texas Monthly dissenters noted, 111 Chief Justice Burger's
Walz opinion offers an alternative view of entanglement, one which
justifies a narrow tax exemption as accommodating the autonomy of
religious actors. In this sense, the Texas Monthly plurality assumes the
answer to the critical question of the case, i.e., whether a narrow tax
benefit restricted to religious entities causes more entanglement (because of the need to define the benefit's borders) or less entanglement (because the state respects the autonomy of the religious sector
by not taxing it).
By assuming the former version of entanglement doctrine,Justice
Brennan and his two colleagues answer in the affirmative the inquiry
of this Article: tax exclusions, deductions, and exemptions for religious institutions are, as a constitutional matter, dependent upon the
extension of the same exclusions, deductions, and exemptions to
secular entities; narrow exemptions for religious bodies and undertakings enmesh government and sectarian institutions in constitutionally
unacceptable conflict over boundary definitions.
Justice ·w hite concurred in striking down the Texas sales tax exemption, relying solely on the Press Clause of the First Amendment. 112
Hen:e, the critical fifth and sixth votes against the Texas exemption
came from Justices Blackmun and O'Connor.
Writing for them both, Justice Blackmun was uncomfortable with
the plurality's approach to Follett and Murdock. Ultimately, however,
Justke Blackmun 's concurrence comes to the same conclusion as JusTexas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20.
See id. at 33-41.
II! See id. at 25 (Blackmun,J. , concurring).
IM
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tice Brennan's plurality opinion: a narrow sales tax exemption restricted to religious publications violates the Establishment Clause; a
broader exemption, for a larger class subsuming religious literamre,
passes constitutional muster.
On the one hand, the plurality, according to Justice Blackrnun,
unnecessarily "repudiat[es] Follett and Murdock," 113 both "longstanding
precedents. "114 On the other hand, "a tax exemption limited to the sale
of religious literature by religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause. "115
For Justice Blackmun, Follett and Murdock might be reconciled
with an Establishment Clause prohibition on state sales taxes "exempting religious literature alone. "116 While the task of such reconciliation
"may be left for another day," 117 the implication is that states must exempt religious literature from sales taxation but must also structure
their sales tax exemptions broadly to include significant nonreligious
publications as well. "[W]hether or not Follett and Murdock prohibit
taxing the sale of religious literature, the Establishment Clause prohibits a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature. "118
Thus, while the tone and reasoning of Justice Blackmun's concurrence differs from that of the Texas Monthly plurality, the bottom
line is the same: a sales tax exemption limited to religious publications violates the Establishment Clause; to pass constitutional muster,
an exemption covering sales of religious literature must cover sales of
secular literature as well.
In Texas Monthly, Justice Scalia dissented for himself, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist, and Justice Kennedy and denounced the opinions of Justices Brennan and Blackmun "[a]s a judicial demolition project"119
which invalidated, not just sales tax exemptions of the sort at issue in
Texas Monthly, but a variety of tax benefits which apply only to religious actors and activities. Such tax benefits "permeate the state and
federal codes," including the federal income tax exclusion for parsonages and parsonage allowances. 120

m Id. at 27 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
Id. (White,]., concurring).
115
Texas Monthly, 489 U .S. at 28 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
116 Id. at 29 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
117 Id. at 28 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
118 Id. at 29 (Blackmun,J., conc111Ting).
119 Id. at 29. While disagreeing with Justice White, Justice Scalia was somewhat more
understated in desci-ibing that disagreement. See id. at 44-45 (Scalia,J., disse ming) .
120 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 33 (Scalia,J., dissenting) .
114
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Citing Walz as an exemplar of the "accommodation principle,"121
Justice Scalia correctly observed that Justice Brennan had conflated
his and Justice Harlan's Walz concurrences with ChiefJustice Burger's
majority opinion. 122 While that majority opinion had noted the
breadth of the New York property tax exemption, that breadth was
not critical to the majority's reasoning. 123 Rather, the central theme of
Walz was the "accommodation principle": 124 "The [Walz] Court did
not .1 pprove an exemption for charities that happened to benefit religion; it approved an exemption for religion as an exemption for religion. "125
Moreover, the Texas sales tax exemption, like the New York
property tax exemption, reduces entanglement:
[H]ere as in Walz, it is all but certain that elimination of the
exemption will have the effect of increasing government's involvement with religion. The Court's invalidation of [the
sales tax exemption] ensures that Texas churches selling
publications that promulgate their religion will now be subject to numerous statutory and regulatory impositions, including audits, requirements for the filing of security, reporting requirements, writs of attachment without bond, tax
liens, and the seizure and sale of property to satisfy tax delinquencies.126
There is an important distinction in Justice Scalia's use of the
terms "accommodation" and "entanglement." He used the latter term
in a sense similar to Justice Harlan's, i.e., the avoidance of litigation
and enforcement-based conflict, and reserved the term "accommodation' to describe more fundamental governmental respect for the
autonomy and sovereignty of religious bodies. In the end, such accommodation/ entanglement concerns led Justice Scalia and his colleag11es to conclude that tax benefits for religious institutions and actors properly recognize the autonomy of religious institutions and do
not depend upon the simultaneous extension of such benefits to secular entities and undertakings. Hence, such tax benefits are constitu-

121
122

Id. at 39 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
Id. at 33 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
123 Id. at 36-37 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
121 /d. at 38-41 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
m Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 38 (Scalia,]. , dissenting) .
126 /d. at 44 (Scalia,]., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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tional when extended to religious groups alone along such lines as
the Texas sales tax exemption.
The Texas Monthly dissenters also found greater force in Follett
and Murdock than did Justice Brennan. While Follett and Murdock "are
narrowly distinguishable," wrote Justice Scalia, since the Texas sales
tax "exemption comes so close to being a constitutionally required
accommodation, there is no doubt that it is at least a permissible
one."127
In short, for the Texas Monthly dissenters, Follett, Murdock, and the
"accommodation principle" articulated by Chief Justice Burger in
Walz indicate that the Texas sales tax exemption for religious literature is, as a First Amendment matter, "not only permissible but perhaps required. "128
Judge Noonan has characterized Texas Monthly as marking the
end of the Supreme Court's "Murdock mind. "129 Perhaps so. But in
Texas Monthly, two concurring justices struggled with the scope of the
Murdock/ Follett principle while the three dissenters professed their
adherence to those earlier decisions. 130
It is therefore all the more striking that the Court's subseq,.1ent
decision in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization resulted in
a single unanimous opinion which effectively eviscerated Murdock and
Follett, and which, for all practical purposes, embraced Justice Brennan's opinions in Walz and Texas Monthly as the Court's controlling
doctrine. 131
California's sales tax statute contains no exemption for religious
items. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries sold religious merchandise in California and claimed a constitutional right to sales tax exemption per
Murdock and Follett.1 32 Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous
Court, rejected this claim to constitutional exemption from California's sales tax.
Justice O'Connor, echoing Justice Brennan's Texas Monthly opinion,133 found the key distinctions between the California sales tax and

Id. at 41---42 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
Id. at 41 (Scalia,J., disse nting).
129 NooNAN, supra note 89, at 193.
130 See supra notes 111-128 and accompanying text.
131 Swaggart Minis/lies, 493 U.S. at 378.
132 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries also sold admittedly nonreligious ite ms in Californi:l, but
did not claim sales tax exeinption for these.
133 While Justice O'Connor, like Justice Brennan, focused upon the flat and pre paid
natme of the Murdock/ Fol!Rtt license fees, Justice O'Connor did not pursue Justice Bren12 7
128
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the municipal license fees at issue in Murdock and Follett to be the flat
and prepaid nature of those municipal fees. 134 In Murdock and Follett,
Justice O'Connor wrote, the "primary vice of the ordinances at issue
was that they operated as prior restraints of constitutionally protected
conduct," i.e. , the rights of the Jehovah's Witnesses to engage in religious solicitation. 135 Such fees "act[ed] as a precondition to the free exercise of religious beliefs" unlike the California sales tax, collected
after a sale had occurred. 136 Moreover, the California sales tax is calibrated to the quantum of the taxpayer's sales; indeed, the tax "represen~. only a small fraction of any retail sale. "137
In short, in Follett and Murdock, it was "the particular nature of
the challenged taxes" which violated the Free Exercise Clause as these
were "flat license taxes that operated as a prior restraint on the exercise of religious liberty. "138
Justice O 'Connor also concluded that the California sales tax,
applied to Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, did not result in excessive entanglement of religion and government. In this context, Justice
O 'Connor used the term "administrative entanglement,"139 signaling
a limited definition of entanglement concerns:
Most significantly, the imposition of the sales and use tax
without an exemption for appellant does not require the
State to inquire into the religious content of the items sold
or the religious motivation for selling or purchasing the
items, because the materials are subject to the tax regardless
of content or motive. From the State's point of view, the
critical question is not whether the materials are religious,
but whether there is a sale or a use, a question which only
involves a secular determination. 140
This is Justice Harlan's conception of entanglement theory, the
avoidance of conflict and litigation over borderlines. From this vantage, no sales tax exemption is less entangling than an exemption lim-

nan 's Lhird disLinction be lween occupational taxes and sales Laxes. See SwagtJarl M inis/lies,
493 U.S. at 387-89.
13I Id.
13 ; Id. at 387.
l ,Vi Id.
131 SwagtJarl M inisflies, 493 U.S. at 389.
u.i Id. at 386.
13' 1 Id. at 393.
14' 1 Id. at 396.
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ited to sales of religious items, given the borderline problems arising
from such a limited exemption.
Indeed, once Justice O'Connor rejected the Follett/ Murdock vision
of constitutionally-required exemption to avoid intrusion into religious activity, the Harlan form of entanglement theory was the only
approach available to her. By definition, the permissive, accommodationist version of entanglement doctrine articulated by Chief Justice
Burger in Walz is inapplicable in a case like Swaggart Ministries, as California chose against accommodation by adopting a sales tax statute
with no religious exemptions.
Particularly significant for the topic of this Article is Justice
O'Connor's observation, in the context of her entanglement analysis,
that Walz approved property tax exemption only "as part of a general
exemption for nonprofit institutions. "141 This observation effectively
elevates the concurrences of Justices Brennan and Harlan into the
Court's official understanding of Walz: tax exemptions, exclusions and
deductions can only be granted to churches if such benefits are simultaneously extended to a broad class of properties. 142 Moreover, while
Justice O'Connor never formally uses the term "subsidy" in Swaggart
Ministries, it is difficult to read that opinion as other than an embrace
ofJustice Brennan's perspective for the Texas Monthly plurality.
Indeed, the conflict between Swaggart Ministries (which finds 1ittle
life in Follett and Murdock) and the analysis of the Texas Monthl) dissenters (which sees greater vitality in those older decisions) leavei: the
reader wondering why those dissenters joined Justice O 'Connor's
opinion. At one level, the Texas Monthly dissent and Swaggart Minishies
can be reconciled via the permissive nature of the accommodation
principle: that Texas may constitutionally exempt religious literature
from sales taxation does not mean that California must exempt in this
fashion. At another level, however, the· Texas Monthly dissent is more
difficult to harmonize with Justice O 'Connor's opinion in Swaggart
Ministries, given their different perceptions of the scope of Follett and
Murdock. If, as Justice Scalia wrote, Texas Monthly was a 'Judicial demolition project," 143 Swaggart Minist·ries carted away the rubble-with no
complaint from the Texas Monthly dissenters.
In contrast to the unanimously-decided Swaggart Ministries, the
Court's earlier decision in Mueller v. Allen reflected another 5-4 split

Id. at 393.
See Swaggart Mi11ist1ies, 493 U.S. at 393.
143 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 29 (Sralia,J. , clisse111ing) .
141

142
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among the justices. 144 In Muelle1; the Court sustained against First
Amendment challenge a Minnesota income tax deduction for parents' expenses for their children's elementary and secondary educatiom.. A critical factor for the five justice majority was the facial
breadth of the deduction, available not just to parents sending their
children to sectarian schools but also to parents educating their offspring in public schools and in secular private institutions. For example, the Minnesota deduction is availab}e if a parent living in one public s<·hool district pays tuition to send her child to a public school in
another district. 145 The deduction is also available if a public school
parent pays for "[c]ertain summer school tuition."146 The deduction is
specifically disallowed for the purchase of religious materials. 147
The majority's principal doctrinal problem in Mueller was to distinguish the Minnesota income tax deduction sustained in that case
from the New York tax provision previously su·uck in Committee for Pub-lie Education v. Nyquist. 148 Among the relevant distinctions, according
to the Mueller Court, was the limited availability of the Nyquist tax
benefits, obtainable only by "parents of children in nonpublic
schools. "149 In contrast, the Minnesota "deduction is available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose children attend public schools and those whose children attend nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private schools. "150
Since Minnesota grants the deduction for educational outlays
"neutrally" to a broad specu·um of citizens, that deduction "is not
readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause. "151
ln response to the assertion that, in practice, "the bulk of deductions" are taken by Minnesota parents sending their children to religious schools, the majority replied that the relevant consideration is
the facial neutrality of the challenged statute.1 52 In response to the
assertion that the Minnesota deduction requires excessive entanglement as "state officials must determine whether particular textbooks
qualify for a deduction" by virtue of their secular content, the majority, without extensive analysis, concluded that that determination is no
Muelle rv. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) .
Id. al 391 n. 2, item 2.
141 ; Id. at 391 n . 2, item 3.
147 Id. at 390 n. 1 (re producing MINN . STAT.
1411 413 U.S. 756 (1973) .
14, 1 463 U.S. at 398.
1511 Id. at 397.
15: Id. at 398-99.
151 ' Id. at 40 I.
14-I

14,,

§

290.09 (22) (2000)) .
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more entangling than other similar judgments the Court had previously approved as consistent with the First Amendment. 153 Finally, in
language reminiscent of Chief Justice Burger's Walz opinion, 154 the
Mueller Court noted the "broad latitude" of the Minnesota legislature
in designing the state's income tax base. 155
In sum, for the Mueller Court, the facial breadth of the Minnesota
tax deduction, available to public school parents and to parents sending their children to secular private schools, immunized the deduction from Establishment Clause challenge.
The Mueller minority accepted none of this. For the minority, the
Minnesota tax deduction is indistinguishable from the New York tax
provision struck in Nyquist. Each constitutes a "subsidy" of sectarian
education in violation of the Establishment Clause. 156 Moreover, in
practice, this tax subsidy is focused upon parents who utilize religious
schools because such parents constitute "the vast majority of the taxpayers who are eligible to receive the benefit" of the deduction. 157
Even if, in practice, the deduction conferred benefits more broadly,
according to the Mueller minority, the deduction would fail constitutional muster as furthering "the religious mission" of sectarian
schools. 158
In short, for the Mueller dissenters, the breadth of the Minnesota
deduction is illusory and irrelevant. The Minnesota deduction is a
subsidy that, as a practical matter, subsidizes religious schools. Ewn if
the deduction in practice subsidized more broadly, it would violate
the Establishment Clause as supporting religious instruction.

III.

ANALYSIS

In light of all of this, are tax benefits for religious institu1ions
constitutionally dependent on benefits for secular entities?
As a matter of positive law, the answer is today a qualified "yes."
The Court's current doctrine, as articulated in Texas Monthly and
Swaggart Ministries, is that exemptions, exclusions, and deductions

153

Id. at 403.
See Walz, 489 U.S. at 680.
155 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Represe ntation of Wash. ,
461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983)).
156 Id. at 408-09 (Marshall, J. , disse nting) ("The statute is little more than a subsidy of
tuition masquerading as a subsidy of genernl educational expe nses.").
1;1 Id. al 405 (Marshall,J., disse nting).
158 Id. al 409 n.2 (M;u-shall,J., disse nting).
154
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limited to religious actors and activities constitute unconstitutional
subsidies in violation of the Establishment Clause.
The strongest statements to the contrary remain Murdock and
Follett, which indicate that exemption is constitutionally compelled for
sect2.rian entities and undertakings when taxation intrudes too deeply
upon the autonomy of religion. However, Texas Monthly and Swaggart
Ministries indicate that there is little vitality left to Follett and Murdock.
After Texas Monthly and Swaggart Ministries, it is hard to envision cases
beyond the specific facts of Follett and Murdock in which tax benefits
limited to religious organizations or activities are constitutionally
compelled or permitted.
The qualification to this conclusion is that, strictly speaking, Texas
Mon~hly and Swaggart Ministries did not inter Follett and Murdock. Indeed, in Swaggart Minist·ties, Justice O'Connor, writing for all nine
members of the Court, was careful to observe that "it is of course possible to imagine that a more onerous tax rate, even if generally applicable, might effectively choke off an adherent's religious practices."159
In practice, however, it is difficult to conceive of a sufficiently "onerous tax rate" which, if generally applied, would today cause the Court
to invoke Follett and Murdock to exempt religious entities or actors.
The other support for tax benefits limited to religious institutions
is the majority opinion in Walz, premised on a concern for the sovereignty of such institutions. The solicitude for "the autonomy and
freedom of religious bodies" 160 which animated Chief Justice Burger's
Walz opinion supports, in the name of accommodation, exemption
from taxation for religious actors and activities, even if other nonprofit institutions and undertakings (without the same First Amendment status) are not so exempted.
However, today it is not Walz, but the Walz concurrences of Justices Brennan and Harlan which guide the Court. Those concurrenc ::s approve of tax benefits for religious institutions only in the
cont,~xt of benefits applying broadly to secular eleemosynary entities
and indicate that exemptions restricted to religious groups create unacceptable entanglement between church and state as they fight over
the boundaries of such exemptions.
Finally, the Mueller Court grounded its approval of state tax deductions for parochial school expenses upon the availability of such

1s• 1 493
1611

U.S. 378, 392 ( 1990) .
397 U.S. 664,672 (1970) .
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deductions for parents sending their children to public schools and to
secular private schools.
The proverbial bottom line is that, given the Court's current case
law, tax benefits extended to religious institutions are constitutional
only as part of benefits granted more broadly to secular persons. In
light of the Court's present predilection to characterize tax exemptions, exclusions, and deductions as subsidies, it is not surprising that
the Court would, as a First Amendment matter, require such subsidies
to be granted broadly and not just concentrated on religious entities
and activities.
These conclusions do not end all inquiry. Most obviously, there is
the question: How broad must a tax benefit be to be broad enough
for First Amendment purposes? If, for example, a state granted property tax exemptions to churches and hospitals, but not to schools, museums, or other charitable institutions, would that exemption be
broad enough to pass constitutional muster?
I leave detailed consideration of this question , and others, for
another day. For purposes of this Article, I would simply paraphrase
Lincoln and answer the inquiry-How broad must tax benefits be?by responding: Broad enough to satisfy the Court. 161
Although, as a matter of positive law, tax exemptions, exclusions,
and deductions for religious institutions are today constitutional only
if such benefits are simultaneously extended to secular entities, as a
normative matter, I come to the opposite conclusion: the constitutionality of tax benefits for sectarian actors and undertakings should
not depend upon benefits being granted concurrently to secular institutions.
The path to this conclusion starts with the recognition that: the
Court has often used the "subsidy" label in a conclusory fashion and
ends with the judgment that Chief Justice Burger's accommodationist
version of entanglement theory is, in the tax context, the most compelling of the available approaches.
As noted earlier, in discussion of tax exemptions, exclusions, and
deductions, the term "subsidy" is typically invoked in a reflexive fashion which ignores the reality that much tax exemption is best understood as base defining. 162 If, to modify an earlier example, 163 a municipality is financed exclusively by property taxes, it is not compelling
161 When asked "How long must a man 's legs be?" P1·eside 11t Lincoln is said to have answered, "Long enough to reach the ground."
162 See m/Jra not es 13-24 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 26-27 and acco mpanying text.
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to characterize the municipality's failure to tax income and sales as a
"subsidy" of income and sales. Rather, that the locality's taxing power
excludes income and sales is a matter of tax base selection. Similarly,
in Murdock and Follett, it is, as Justice Murphy noted, 164 unconvincing
to characterize the Court as creating subsidies since, under the
Court's holdings, the municipalities could not, consistent with the
Free Exercise clause, impose their license taxes on religious canvassers. [f the constitutionally-mandated tax base excludes such taxes to
begin with, it is not a "subsidy" to refrain from taxation but, rather,
the implementation of the constitutionally-required tax base.
In sum, no one has ever refuted Professor Bittker's observation of
a generation ago 165 that the "subsidy" moniker is convincingly applied
to an exemption, deduction, or exclusion only after there is agreement about a 166 normative tax base from which such exemption, deduction, or exclusion deviates. 167
Hence the analytical weakness of the Court's deployment of the
"subsidy" designation: an exemption is a subsidy only if it deviates
from a normative tax base. However, entanglement/accommodation
concerns tracing back at least to Walz suggest that exemptions for religious entities are normatively appropriate recognitions of the
autonomy of such entities. The reflexive invocation of the "subsidy"
label, explicitly or implicitly, thus assumes away the key issue, i.e.,
whether tax exemption is a constitutionally proper acknowledgment
of the sovereignty of sectarian institutions. If so, the resulting tax
benefits are not subsidies because they implement, rather than deviate from, a normative tax base.
Consider again, in this context, Texas Monthly. If one grants the
plurality's premise that Texas' sales tax exemption is a subsidy, the
plurality's conclusion is compelling: because the subsidy extends only
to rdigious publications, that subsidy runs afoul of the Establishment
Clause as a subvention of religion. However, the "subsidy" label is only
1E4 See Follett v. Town ofMcConnick, 321 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1944) (Murphy,]., concurring).
rn 5 SPe Bittker, supra note 25, at 260-61.
166 Implicit in the use of the anicle "a" is an important contention: Since tax base
definition typically involves selection from a range of plausible alternatives, there is 1)1)ically no single nonnati\'e tax but, rathei-, a spectrum of normatively plausible tax bases.
Hence, it makes sense to speak of "a" normali\'e tax. ra1he1· than "the" nonnative tax. Of
cours,~, tax expenditure stalwans reject this approach. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified
Plans and ldl'ntijj,ing Tax Ex/1e11dit11rps: A RPjoinder to Profmor Stl'i11, 9 AM. J. TAX PoL'v 257,
259-62 (1991).
1c7 See Bittker, s11/1m note 25, at 260-61.
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convincing after one rejects the proffered justification for the sales tax
exemption-that it is a constitutionally permitted accommodation of
the autonomy of religious institutions and activity. If that justification
is correct, there is no "subsidy" in exempting sales of religious literature since, in respecting religious sovereignty, the Texas sales tax statute defines a constitutionally appropriate tax base. 168
Moreover, the emphasis of the Muell.er majority on the breadth of
the Minnesota tax deduction is only understandable if the majority
implicitly accepted the "subsidy" label pinned by the minority on the
deduction. If the deduction is a subsidy, it is sensible to defend that
subsidy, as the majority did, by its facial breadth, breadth which suggests that the deduction subsidizes education, not religious education.
If, in contrast, the deduction is not a subsidy, but, rather, a recognition of religious autonomy, the relevant issue is whether, under the
First Amendment, such recognition of religious autonomy is constitutionally permissible.
There is, thus, an intimate relationship among the concepts of
subsidy, tax base definition, and entanglement/ accommodation: the
"subsidy" label is convincing only after we define a normative tax base
from which the alleged subsidy deviates. However, a tax base can constitutionally serve as a normative baseline only if it passes First
Amendment muster in entanglement/ accommodation terms.
In short, the underlying issue in these cases is not the
classification vel non of a particular tax provision as a subsidy. Once we
pierce through the "subsidy" label, the fundamental choice in these
cases is the version of entanglement theory to be applied under the
First Amendment.
Justice Harlan's theory indicates that exemptions, deductions,
and exclusions limited to religious institutions and actors are exces168 From this vantage, Swaggart Mi nis/lies was correc tly d ecided even if Texas Monthly
was not. Once constitutionally-compelled exemption a la Fol/ell and Murdock is foreclosed ,
the two 1·emaining approaches 10 entangle me nt concen1s ,u-e the con11·asting vantages of
Justice Harlan (exemptio n limited to 1·eligious e ntities creates unacceptable e nt;mgleme nt) and Chief Justice Bm·ger (exemption of 1·eligious institutions is a constitutionally
permissive accommodatio n of religion) .
Fro m bo th perspectives, the re is no infirmi ty to California's sales tax s1a1u1e
since, pe1· the Burge r fonnulation, accommodation is permiu ed lmt 11 01 requi1·ed •vhilt'.
per the Harlan approach , Califon1ia's statut e properly avoids entangle ment by taxing 1·eligious publications, thereby foregoing border-defining conflict over the contour! of a
n arrow exe mption for religious literature .
'
Indeed , fro m this vantage, the re is logic to the participation (if no t the silence)
of the Texas Mo nthly disse nters in Swaggart iVlinist,ies: Texas can recognize th e autonomy of
re ligions ac tors but California is not required 10.
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sively entangling because of the borderline conflict such narrowlyfocused tax benefits engender. ChiefJustice Burger's accommodationist vantage, on the other hand, suggests that taxing religious entities is
entangling because of enforcement problems and that, in any event,
resp':'!ct for sectarian autonomy permits states to refrain from taxing.
Insofar as these contrasting perspectives represent empirical disagreement, there is evidence on both sides and no yardstick of which
I know with which to measure whether borderline or enforcement
controversies entail greater entanglement. 169
The issue, at its core, turns, not on the much used "subsidy" label, but on one's conception of the mandate of the First Amendment.
If the First Amendment permits governments to refrain from taxation
in recognition of the sovereignty of religious actors and activities, Justice Burger wins the debate and tax benefits extended solely to religious institutions pass constitutional muster as acknowledgments of
that sovereignty. If, in contrast, tax exemption limited to religious institutions constitutes impermissible governmental involvement in sectarian affairs, Justice Harlan wins the debate because such exemption
involves borderline conflict of the sort against which Justice Harlan
warned in Walz.
Reasonable and public-spirited persons disagree as to these matters. Let me suggest, however, that, in the context of tax exemptions,
ther~ are two tax-specific reasons for privileging the "accommodation
prindple" 170 over its competitor, the Harlan avoidance-of-conflict approach-reasons I think should be persuasive even for those generally
unsympathetic to the accommodationist perspective.
The first of these reasons is historical: the accommodationist account explains the thoughts and actions of the founding generation.
Much ink has been spilled addressing the apparent paradox that the
founding generation proclaimed the separation of church and state
whil,:'! simultaneously confirming and extending tax exemption for
chmches. 171 From a subsidy perspective, there is indeed a paradox to
16 l In recent times, the best known boundary dispute has been the protrncted conflict
between the IRS and the Church of Scientology over the fed eral income tax charitable
ded11<tion . See Paul Streckfus, Scientolngy Case Redux, 87 TAX NOTES 1414 (June 5, 2000). As
to enlo t-cem ent controve1·sies, the most recent such controversy 1·eceiving national attention l: as bee n the IRS's seizm·e of the Indianapolis Baptist Te mple to enforce tax liens. See
Go1J/'nu11ent Seizes Indiana/Jo/is Chunh in Tax Dispute, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 14, 2001,
at 36-108.
in Texas MonthlJ, 489 U.S. at 39 (Scalia,]. , dissenting).
m See, e.g., Walz, 397 U .S. at 661-68 (Brennan,]., concuning), 704-07 (Douglas,].,
concuJTing), 716--27 (appendix to Justice Douglas' dissent).
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proclaiming that religion should be disestablished while concurrently
confirming the subsidization of religion via tax benefits.
However, the contradiction disappears if the founding generation did not think of tax exemption as subsidy, but as neutrality. We
should apply our intellectual categories to the past with great care. As
Professor Diamond observes, the irregular nature of taxation in colonial times suggests that exemptions carried different meaning then
than now.17 2 Moreover, the colonists continued many pre-existing exemptions with little discussion, almost as a matter of inertia.
On balance, the most sensible resolution of the asserted paradox
of the founding generation simultaneously propounding separationism and exemption is that that generation thought of exemption as a
form of separationism, in our vocabulary, a recognition of secta.rian
autonomy. The founders thus, by their actions, implicitly sided with
the ChiefJustice in the Burger-Harlan debate: tax exemption properly
recognizes sectarian autonomy and is accordingly compatible with the
separation of church and state.
The second reason, in the tax context, for p1·eferring the accommodationist version of entanglement theory is the illusory nature
of Justice Harlan's promise that conflict will be avoided by ta"ing
churches. Whether the state taxes or exempts religious groups, there
will be conflict between secular and sectarian authority. If chur.::hes
are tax exempt, the conflict will, as Justice Harlan observed, be over
the boundaries of exemption; if churches are taxed, the conflict, as
Chief Justice Burger suggested, 173 will be over enforcement. Indeed,
the problems of valuing religious assets for property taxation seem
particularly severe .174
If Justice Harlan 's account of taxation as conflict avoiding were
persuasive, it might convince us to disregard the lessons to be drawn
from history and conclude that taxing religious institutions entangles
government and church less than exempting such institutions. But
that account is ultimately unpersuasive since taxing sectarian actors
and activity is as litigation-engendering as granting them exemption.

172

See Diamond, supra note 15.
See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674; id. at 698-99 (Harlan,J., concuITing).
174 The valuation of real estate is often difficult under real property and transfer tax
systems. See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionis111, and the
Virtue of Allairiable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 861, 881-83 (1997). For much singll' purpose religious property, valuation proble ms are even greate r, given the infreque nC) with
which such prope rty is sold and such property's non-income producing nature .
173
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The upshot, I suggest, is that the accommodationist perspective is
the most convincing of the alternatives in the tax context. If, in accordance with that perspective, the First Amendment permits governments to refrain from taxation as a recognition of the autonomy of
religious institutions and undertakings, tax benefits extended solely to
religious institutions should pass constitutional muster as acknowledgments of that autonomy and should not be dismissed in conclusory fashion as subsidies of the sectarian. 175
CONCLUSION

Today, the Supreme Court's case law generally conditions tax exemptions, deductions, and exclusions for religious institutions upon
the concurrent extension of such benefits to secular entities and activities. The Court's position flows logically from its acceptance of the
premise that tax exemptions, deductions, and exclusions constitute
subsidies.
However, as a normative matter, my conclusion is to the contrary.
In the context of tax benefits, the "subsidy" label is usually deployed
in a conclusory and unconvincing fashion. The First Amendment is
best understood as permitting governments to refrain from taxation
to accommodate the autonomy of religious actors and activities;
hence, tax benefits extended solely to sectarian institutions should
pass constitutional muster as recognition of that autonomy. Since it is
most compelling to conceive of religious tax exemption as the acknowledgment of sectarian sovereignty, rather than the subsidization
of religion, there is no convincing constitutional reason to link that
exernption to the simultaneous extension of comparable tax benefits
to secular entities and undertakings.
In the final analysis, tax exemption does not subsidize churches,
but leaves them alone.

m As noted previously, tax benefits limited to religious institutions may raise policy
considerations which suggest that such benefits should be offe1·ed mo1·e brnadly. My conclusion is that tax deductions, exclusions, and exemptions restricted to religious institutions .u-e constitutional, not that they are necessarily wise .

